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Abstract
Context: Safety analysis is a predominant activity in developing safety-critical systems. It
is a highly cooperative task among multiple functional departments due to increasingly so-
phisticated safety-critical systems and close-knit development processes. Communication
occurs pervasively.
Motivation: Effective communication channels among multiple functional departments in-
fluence safety analysis quality as well as a safe product delivery. However, the use of com-
munication channels during safety analysis is sometimes arbitrary and poses challenges.
Objective: In this article, we aim to investigate the existing communication channels, their
usage frequencies, their purposes and challenges during safety analysis in industry.
Method: We conducted a multiple case study by surveying 39 experts and interviewing
21 experts in safety-critical companies including software developers, quality engineers and
functional safety managers. Direct observations and documentation review were also con-
ducted.
Results: Popular communication channels during safety analysis include formal meetings,
project coordination tools, documentation and telephone. Email, personal discussion, train-
ing, internal communication software and boards are also in use. Training involving safety
analysis happens 1-4 times per year, while other aforementioned communication channels
happen ranging from 1-4 times per day to 1-4 times per month. We summarise 28 purposes
of using these aforementioned communication channels. Communication happens mostly
for the purpose of clarifying safety requirements, fixing temporary problems, conflicts and
obstacles and sharing safety knowledge. The top 10 challenges are: (1) sensitiveness and
confidentiality of safety analysis information; (2) fragmented safety analysis information;
(3) inconsistent safety analysis information; (4) asynchronous channels; (5) a lack of tool
support; (6) misunderstanding between developers and safety analysts; (7) language, geo-
graphic and culture limitations; (8) unwillingness to communicate (groupthink); (9) storage,
authority, regulation and monitoring of safety analysis information; (10) a lack of documen-
tation concerning safety analysis to support communication.
Conclusion: During safety analysis, to use communication channels effectively and avoid
challenges, a clear purpose of communication during safety analysis should be established
at the beginning. We have limitations primarily on the research context namely the scope
of domains, participants and countries. To derive countermeasures of fixing the top 10
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challenges are potential next steps.
Keywords: Safety analysis; Communication; Purposes; Challenges; Case study;
Safety-critical systems.
1. Introduction
Safety analysis plays an important role in developing safety-critical systems. It aims
at deriving safety requirements throughout the safety-critical system’s development lifecycle
[1]. By performing safety analysis, potential causes of accidents can be identified, eliminated
or controlled in design or operation before damage occurs [2]. Due to an inherently complex
nature of safety-critical systems, safety analysis concentrates not just on single component
or function failures, but rather analysing from a system viewpoint including component
interactions, cognitive complex human decision-making errors, social, organisational and
management factors [2].
In safety-critical systems’ organisation management, safety analysis is changing from
individual tasks, which are mainly performed in the development team, to joint work with
an alignment of multiple functional departments or external organisations, such as customers
or suppliers [1]. Safety requirements need to be provided by customers to the development
team, while detailed safety information of products need to be provided from suppliers to
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Among the stakeholders during safety analysis,
communication occurs across different channels.
Leveson mentioned: “Risk perception (in safety analysis) is directly related to communica-
tion and feedback. The design of communication channels must be considered." [2] (P.424).
In the automotive domain, experts mentioned in the standard: “The organisation should
institute, execute and maintain processes to ensure that identified functional safety anoma-
lies are explicitly communicated to responsible persons" [3] (Part 2, P.13). In the nuclear
power domain, experts mentioned that: “Communication should be honest and open when
answering to safety-related questions" [4] (P.53). In the aviation domain, experts mentioned:
“Projects should plan for the appropriate level of technical oversight to ensure communica-
tion." [5] (P.528). It requires communication among team members, with the certification
authority and customers. Therefore, in the safety-critical industries, the organisation man-
agement should promote effective communication channels during safety analysis at all levels.
However, in practice, communication channels during safety analysis for safety-critical
systems’ development are uncultivated [1]. Using formal documentation is a classic way
during safety analysis to complement communication [6]. It ensures a correct and complete
information transfer. However, at present, the market of safety-critical systems is becoming
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fast-changing. The increasingly incoming customer requirements are captured by face-to-
face communications [7]. These informal communication channels are arbitrarily used by
practitioners and not regulated by relevant authorities. Thus, we support Keyton’s [8] and
Kraut et al.’s [9] views that an exploration of the existing communication channels during
safety analysis in developing safety-critical systems becomes necessary, including their types,
their usage frequencies as well as their purposes.
RQ 1 Which communication channels are adopted for safety analysis?
Through investigating the existing communication channels during safety analysis, we
can (1) have an overview of the communication scope in our research context during
performing safety analysis; (2) identify the challenges on each communication channel,
which will possibly influence the results of safety analysis, and further lead to an unsafe
product.
RQ 2 How frequently used are safety analysis communication channels?
Through investigating the using frequency of each communication channel, we can (1)
acquire that which communication channel acts as a major role, which could have a
large impact on the results of safety analysis; (2) help process improvements through
adjusting the using frequency of communication channels.
RQ 3 Which are the purposes of safety analysis communication channels?
Through investigating the purposes of these communication channels, we can avoid the
repeated use of multiple communication channels for the same purpose. In addition,
for a clear communication purpose, we can select a suitable communication channel.
Furthermore, communication channels during safety analysis in developing safety-critical
systems are problematic [7]. Practitioners in safety-critical industries notice their negative
impacts from various perspectives, such as a poor management (an overwhelming amount of
information and a loss of details) of safety analysis related information [10] or little support
for requirements engineering (a non-standardisation of nomenclature, the incompleteness of
safety requirements and a lack of tool support) [6]. Yet, as called by Dobson et al. [11],
Vilela et al. [6] and Kraut et al. [9], scarce research explores the challenges in communication
channels during safety analysis.
RQ 4 What are the challenges when using safety analysis communication chan-
nels?
Through investigating the challenges of these communication channels, we can pro-
vide practitioners hints of problems to avoid when they use one of the communication
channels. Moreover, a clear research of challenges can help the researchers to look for
suitable solutions.
1.1. Research Objectives
In this article, the overall purpose is to investigate communication channels during safety
analysis in developing safety-critical systems. First, we investigate the existing communi-
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cation channels including their frequencies among multiple functional departments. Fur-
thermore, we address their purposes in connection to the existing communication channels.
Finally, we derive the top 10 challenges and map them with the aforementioned purposes.
1.2. Contribution
In this article, we have the following contributions:
1. We find 9 popular communication channels including their usage frequencies during
safety analysis. We notice that safety-critical systems have strict government regula-
tions and the communication cannot be in public. Thus, the number of used commu-
nication channels is small in comparison with the existing communication channels in
social media [12]. Yet, these 9 communication channels lay a foundation for further
research. Most of them are used at a 1-4 times per week rate.
2. We address 28 purposes based on the 9 communication channels during safety analysis.
Although the number of communication channels during safety analysis is small, the
purposes are diverse.
3. We provide the top 10 challenges in the communication channels during safety analysis
and map them with the 28 purposes. We highlight a possible way to select communi-
cation channels for achieving different purposes. The general challenges have specific
manifestations as well as countermeasures when using different channels serving dif-
ferent purposes.
1.3. Outline
The article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the background of commu-
nication channels and the related work regarding our study. We define a theoretical lens
of communication channels during safety analysis in Section 3. Section 4 presents the case
study design including context, research questions, data collection and analysis procedures.
In Section 5, we report our study results. We discuss our implications and limitations in
Section 6, before concluding our article in Section 7.
2. Background and Related Work
2.1. Communication channels in traditional organisation management
Communication channels in organisation management is a wide-ranging topic, which
demonstrates how people use verbal and nonverbal messages to generate meanings within
and across various contexts, cultures and media [8].
Keyton [8] concluded a literature study by describing practical implications of areas con-
cerning communication in organisation management. He summarised the theories from a
philosophical perspective, such as a system theoretical approach, which depicts that mes-
sages are created, delivered and received by individuals in a complex web of relationships
(safety analysis happens in a complex environment in industry), as well as a critical culture
perspective, which points out that critical work encourages the exploration of alternative
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communication practices that allow greater democracy (safety analysis, as a critical fac-
tor, endures great influences from safety culture). In addition to the theories, the author
posed future research questions, such as (1) What are effective ways for team members from
different professions to develop shared meaning? To perform safety analysis, a common un-
derstanding should be established among stakeholders. (2) How do culture of organisations
and politics influence employees (mis)use of technology? The execution of safety analysis
is strongly influenced by safety culture and politics. In practice, communication channels
are used with diverse taxonomies, such as verbal or nonverbal, synchronous or asynchronous
and internal or external.
Johnson et al. [13] investigated how to determine the use of communication channels in
different taxonomies by conducting 380 surveys in a large midwestern state governmental
agency. The authors mentioned that to use formal or informal communication channels, per-
ceived applicability, output’s effect and cultural norms are three possible criteria. Traditional
safety-critical systems have a preference for formal communication to ensure preciseness [14].
Yet, many informal communication channels arise currently in safety-critical industries.
Storey et al. [15] focused on communication channels in organisation management during
software development. They conducted a large-scale survey with 1,449 GitHub users to dis-
cuss the channels that the developers find essential to their work and gain an understanding
of the challenges they face using them. 16 challenges are proposed under developer issues,
collaboration and coordination hurdles, barriers to community building and participation,
social and human communication, affordances, literacy and friction and content and knowl-
edge management. Safety analysis intertwines with software development. Some of these
challenges do exist during safety analysis in our context, such as geographic problems. Yet,
they differ from manifestations. In software development, the authors considered geographic
problems due to different time zones. An effective communication software, such as Slack,
can reduce this problem. However, during safety analysis, geographic problems influence
safety analysis information transmission and safety knowledge sharing. A pure communica-
tion software cannot solve this problem with respect to safety culture fundamentally.
Kraut et al. [9] investigated the use of informal communication channels in an R&D
organisation management through an experiment in which two small work groups were
compared. The locations, the usage frequencies and the duration of informal communication
are depicted with practical examples. They believed that in R&D organisations, informal
communication is keen to enhance collaborations and increase projects’ success rates. During
safety analysis, communication is becoming informal. Yet, these informal communication
channels have not been considered as a way to improve collaborations.
2.2. Communication channels in modern organisation management
Modern software development processes are moving from heavy-weight with a huge
amount of documents, to light-weight, with much oral communication. Communication
channels receive much attention from practitioners [16] [17]. They advocate that face-to-
face conversation is the best form of communication [18]. The practical activities encompass
pair programming [19] to enhance communication between developers or stand up meet-
ings [20] to enhance communication among team members. Thus, the research concerning
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communication design or the importance of social skills are arising in modern organisation
management. They are considered as a factor influencing team work quality and project
success [21].
Pikkarainen et al. [22] conducted a case study in F-Secure with two agile software devel-
opment projects. The authors explored challenges focusing on internal and external commu-
nication. Since the groups are becoming self-organised in their research context, the com-
munication among team members and between team members and customer, management,
support group, enterprise staff show increasing challenges, such as a lack of coordination [23]
and a non-deterministic decision-making process [24].
Hummel, Rosenkranz and Holten [7] conducted a systematic literature review with 333
relevant papers on agile software development and communication. They discussed the re-
sults from three directions: Input including team distribution, team size, project domain;
Output including software development success; Agile software development including ex-
treme programming (XP) and Scrum. The authors noted that the project domain poses
specific issues on communication channels, such as safety or security-critical systems which
rely on documentation, yet the changing requirements are not well documented. Moreover,
when developing complex systems, there are lapses of memory which negatively influence
communication. Safety-critical systems development is becoming light-weight [25]. In par-
ticular, an integrated safety analysis happens more frequently. Special attention is needed
in organisation.
2.3. Communication challenges in safety-critical systems
Developing or operating safety-critical systems encompasses specific communication chal-
lenges. Dobson, Moors and Norris [11] conducted a literature review concerning the com-
munication in safety-critical systems by illustrating examples like tragic loss in an Esso gas
plant explosion in 2001 (a combination of ineffective communication and inadequate haz-
ard assessment), fire in a ship called Scandinavian Star in 1990 (a lack of communication
between rescue co-ordination and passengers) and the Tenerife Airport Disaster in 1979
(misinterpretation by the Captain of the aircraft). The authors pointed out that (1) there is
a link between communication and safety, (2) there is a range of mechanisms by which com-
munication can fail, (3) there is a range of factors that shape the safety of communications,
(4) formal, structured communication is most effective but needs to be use appropriately.
Some possible communication problems contain missing, unnecessary, inaccurate, poor qual-
ity and ambiguous information. Improvements might be a careful specification, a moderate
cutting-down, the utilisation of aids such as logs, the development of communication skills
and the setting of standards for effective and safe communication [26]. Some causalities have
been investigated.
Flin et al. [27] classified these causalities into internal and external factors in their book.
Internal factors can be attributed to characteristics of individuals, while external factors
can be attributed to environments. Gibson [28] identified five key elements by conducting a
literature review, which include (1) the communication process of sender-medium-receiver,
(2) the goals of the communication process, (3) the language used in the communication
process, (4) the context of communication, and (5) individual factors. There are further
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recommendations in terms of explicitness, timing, assertiveness and active listening to im-
prove communication in organisations [27]. These articles demonstrated a link between
communication and safety-critical issues, as well as the specific elements and recommen-
dations in safety-critical industries compared to the general communication in organisation
management.
Vilela et al. [6] conducted a systematic literature review with 57 papers to investigate the
communication between requirements engineering and safety engineering (including safety
analysis). The research questions concern the activities, techniques, information artifacts,
tools and benefits of performing safety analysis in connection with requirements engineering.
36 activities were listed by the authors. They mentioned that during these activities, a lack
of a unified vocabulary among stakeholders hampers the communication. The techniques
are illustrated by taxonomies, such as inductive/deductive and qualitative/quantitative.
These taxonomies are considered to reduce the gap in communication between requirements
engineering and safety engineering. The content of safety requirements is the main informa-
tion through communication, which include safety-significant requirements and pure safety
requirements as well as accidents, hazards, risks and harms. To promote an effective com-
munication, practitioners should create an agreed-upon vocabulary and semantic structure
containing all the relevant concepts, their relations and axioms within the safety domain
for the purpose of exchanging information and facilitating reasoning. 66.67% of the studies
do not cite the use of tools. A lack of tools would lead to missing a sufficient guidance for
execution and communication in safety analysis. Thus, it is worth noticing that an effective
communication in safety analysis can reduce errors in requirements specification, improve
system safety, help design, reduce costs and time, improve cooperation, enhance traceability,
better present safety information, reduce workload, reduce interface faults, increase confi-
dence and allow user feedback.
3. Communication in Safety Analysis
We define a theoretical lens of communication in safety analysis. We refer to the stan-
dards ISO 26262, ISO 14971 and IEC 60601 concerning the execution of safety analysis in
safety-critical systems, as well as several internal safety analysis standards.
Safety analysis happens primarily in four stages in the development of safety-critical
systems. (1) At the beginning, a safety expert (he or she could be a functional safety man-
ager, external safety expert or internal safety expert) together with other project members,
who are responsible for facing customer projects, derive system-level safety requirements.
Popular techniques are Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Hazard Analysis and
Risk Assessment (HARA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). (2) After architectural design, the
safety expert, development teams and other stakeholders derive detailed safety requirements
and implement them in development. Popular techniques are Failure Mode and Effect Anal-
ysis (FMEA) for software and Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) for
hardware. (3) A verification, such as model checking, is necessary for testing the detailed
safety requirements. (4) A validation, such as a review, is done by the deployment depart-
ment or customers to test the system-level safety requirements. In addition to these four
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stages, safety analysis might happen during change impact analysis when there is a changing
request. The concrete execution of safety analysis depends on whether they aim to develop
a new product or reuse a product.
Figure 1: Theoretical lens of communication channels
The theoretical lens is shown in Figure 1. The communication encompasses internal
communication and external communication. We simplify the roles in the development
team with one internal safety expert, who mainly performs safety analysis, and other
team members, which include architects, developers, testers and so on. The internal com-
munication happens between the internal safety expert and other team members. Besides
the development team, the industries also establish a functional safety department,
which takes responsibility for the whole functional safety issues at the company level. In
the functional safety department, a functional safety manager fixes mainly the exter-
nal affairs and monitoring the execution of standards, while an external safety expert
keeps contact with the internal safety expert to conduct training or knowledge sharing. In
industry, the safety analysis related collaborative activities, such as execution and review,
are guided by a safety analysis moderator, who is from a technical support depart-
ment. The moderator ensures an official procedure to perform safety analysis. To ensure
the safety assurance capability concerning process execution, the industries perform safety
audit/assessment periodically by a safety auditor or assessor. It happens two to three
times per year, especially when there is a deliverable product. The communication happens
also between the development team and project manager, customers, suppliers and
other non-functional departments, when the safety analysis issues concern project-level,
product-level, purchasing or sales.
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4. Case study design
We chose an exploratory case study design as proposed by Runeson et al. [29]. We
conducted this case study in an inductive way by designing the theoretical lens in Figure 1.
The reasons are: (1) There is no existing theory on communication channels during safety
analysis, such as the possible channels and using regulations. (2) The exploration scope is
indeterministic in terms of communication channels in safety analysis due to an omnicoop-
eration. (3) The boundaries of safety analysis activities need to be clear for investigating
communications, since some of them are blurred within development activities. This the-
oretical lens can provide us a clear boundary of our article and lay a foundation for our
results.
4.1. Context
Table 1: Research context
Company Size Location Domain Main products Employees Participants
A Large Germany Automotive Automotive parts; Power tools;
Electronics; Motorised bicycle
motors.
400,500 3
A1 Medium China Automotive Automotive parts; Power tools;
Electronics; Motorised bicycle
motors.
59,000 26
A2 Medium China Automotive Gasoline engine management
systems; Transmission control
system; Hybrid and electric
drive control system.
9,400 19
A3 Medium China Automotive Diesel systems for passenger
cars, light and heavy commer-
cial vehicles.
1,800 3
B Large Germany Medical Equip-
ment
CT/SPECT scanner; Angiog-
raphy; X-ray products; Molec-
ular diagnostics.
372,000 4
C Medium Germany
(Italy)
Automotive Automotive lighting; Power-
train; Suspension systems; Mo-
torsport.
43,000 3
D Small Germany Industrial 4.0
Based Product
System
Technical strategy for produc-
tion; ICT for manufacturing;
Communication for factories;
Process planning.
Less than
100 (unsta-
ble)
2
We conducted a multiple case study in seven safety-critical companies (three of which
are subsidiaries of company A), as we can see in Table 1. We selected company A, together
with A1, A2 and A3, as our biggest sample (with overall 51 participants). To cover different
sizes of companies, we included company C (medium) and company D (small). To expand
our research domains (company A is an international automotive industry), we included
company B (an international medical equipment industry) and company D (a local industry
4.0 based production system). The duration of the investigated projects varies from 6 months
to 3 years. The safety assurance processes of them follow ISO 26262 (automotive), VDA
(automotive), Automotive SPICE, ISO 14971 (medical equipment), ISO 15004 (medical
equipment) and IEC 60601 (medical equipment). The safety analysis is following the internal
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standards of FMEA, FTA and HAZOP. The investigated projects encompass functional
development of ECU (Electronic Control Unit), NCU (New energy Control Unit) and body
electronic control units, remote monitoring of CT machines and software services for smart
factories.
To include as many participants as possible, we encouraged the people in our research
context, who have joined the safety analysis activities to participate in our survey. We
selected 21 participants to join our interviews depending on their experience, positions and
working years regarding safety analysis to gain the highest possible variability in our data.
Other 39 participants, who are relative new to safety analysis, took part in the surveys.
We asked the 21 interviewees before the interviews to ensure that they have not answered
the surveys before. Their working experiences in safety-critical industries range from 1 to
23 years. As shown in Figure 2, most participants are quality assurance engineers and
managers. 17 participants are from the quality assurance (QA) department. 10 participants
are from the functional safety department. There are 23 managers and 3 experts. Other
roles are 9 developers, 1 analyst and 2 leaders, as well as 1 participant in sales, 1 participant
in purchasing and 1 participant in production department.
Figure 2: Participants
4.2. Data collection
As we can see in Figure 3, we conducted three rounds of data collection incrementally.
In the first round, we ran surveys in seven companies between 2017-09-01 and 2017-10-31
to investigate the existing communication channels as well as their usage frequencies. In
the second round, we conducted semi-structured interviews and documentation reviews in
seven companies separately between 2017-09-01 and 2017-10-31 and between 2017-12-01
and 2018-01-31 to investigate their purposes and challenges. In the third round, from 2017-
12-18 to 2018-01-05, the first author participated in several safety analysis meetings and
the daily work in a functional safety department. The duration of participant observation
is three weeks in company A2. Before data collection, we pre-interviewed several experts
from four companies, either by telephone or by a face-to-face introductory meeting, to look
through the organisation structure, decide on a common objective, establish agreements and
help designing the surveys and interview questions. Each interview lasted one hour. These
experts were further arranged to be the representative of each company.
In the first round, we used a survey to collect both qualitative and quantitative data,
which cover the participant’s background (positions, working years, the descriptions and
durations of the running projects), the existing communication channels and the frequencies
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of using each communication channel. We sent the link to each representative via email, as
well as the survey in electronic form to ensure that all the participants receive them. Since
the investigation including the questions and predictable answers are sensitive in safety-
critical systems, we decided to hand out the surveys through a company representative.
This leads to a limited number of participants, which poses a challenge. During these
two months, the first author checked the progress every two weeks through communicating
with the representatives by videophone regarding the distribution of the surveys, as well as
problems and feedback.
In the second round, we used semi-structured interviews to investigate the purposes and
challenges of the communication channels. We selected firstly the communication channels
from the results in the first round. We asked the interviewees to indicate possible additional
communication channels as the first question. Moreover, we asked for the possible purposes
of each communication channel. We went deeper to gain some real examples. The results
may refer to product and customers’ information, we keep them confidential. Lastly, we
inquired about the challenges. We explained that the challenges they found could be specific
to one communication channel, or in a general way across multiple channels. To make each
challenge clear, we asked further in-depth sub-questions depending on participants’ answers,
such as “Who are the senders and receivers?", “What are the possible effects?", “How serious
are the effects?", “What are the causal factors?", “How do you treat or fix this challenge?".
We listed some possible in-depth sub-questions in the interview guide. Meanwhile, the first
author reviewed the documents, which are related to the communication that happens during
safety analysis, such as R&D process instruments including safety analysis activities or
interfaces in R&D process, product development reports including the safety part of product
development and quality management reports including safety quality management, quality
management handbooks, R&D risk management instructions, FMEA, FTA and HAZOP
guidelines and working instructions, decision analysis and making reports and technical
review reports. We inspected their contents, structures and relevant senders (editors) and
receivers (readers or users) to analyse aspects such as “Are the contents fully written and
could they be easy to understand by the receivers (readers and users)?", “Are they clearly
structured by the senders (editors)?" and “How long do the documents need to be looked
through and be used?"
In the third round, the first author conducted a direct observation in company A2. The
first author took part in several team meetings such as a meeting concerning a comparison
between the existing safety analysis procedure and a new version of ISO 26262, a meeting
to discuss how safety analysis is executed in software and hardware development and how
to coordinate with cyber-physical security. The first author observed the daily work in a
functional safety department (she sat near to an internal safety expert who performed the
safety analysis). Apart from the regular processes such as “How frequently does the internal
safety expert communicate?", the first author observed also the internal safety expert’s verbal
communication with the functional safety manager, developers and stakeholders in non-
functional departments, as well as the non-verbal communication, such as the internal safety
expert’s field notes, which recorded some outputs from communication. In the following
section, we present how we analyse our data.
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Pre-Interviews Surveys
Interviews
Documentation review
Participant 
observation
2017-08-01 2017-10-012017-09-01 2017-11-01 2017-12-01 2018-01-01 2018-02-01
Figure 3: Timeline of data collection
4.3. Data analysis
To start answering our research questions, we investigate the participants’ qualifications,
such as positions, working experiences and running projects.
For qualitative data, we consider basic coding steps and follow the logic of grounded
theory coding [30], since grounded theory is recommended as a powerful way for not only
collecting and inspecting data, but also analysing data from the very beginning, as well
as categorising and drawing meaningful conclusion. We chose the basic coding steps from
Grounded Theory to systematically categorise and abstract the data. To start with, we
conduct open coding to keep initial coding open-ended without having any preconceived
concepts. Since the topic concerning communication channels has a wide range, even in
safety analysis activities, open coding seems the most appropriate way to record transcripts
line-by-line. Furthermore, based on an initial coding process, we get first categories. We list
a preliminary category and conduct a selective coding. We focus on the codes relating
to complementing the existing communication channels for RQ 1 and complementing the
frequencies of using each communication channel, their purposes for RQ 3 as well as their
challenges for RQ 4. The selective coding process is emergent and iterative. We compare
the codes and refine our categories. For example, in terms of RQ 1, some interviewees
mentioned that the communication channels lack a clear clarification, such as “If a personal
meeting with two people is a formal meeting or personal discussion?" We discuss the bias
separately with an expert in company A to complement the results. In terms of RQ 2, after
the first round of selective coding, some purposes show similarities, such as “We use email
to inform a temporary meeting" and “We call the colleagues to fix an emergent complaint",
we group them as “A real-time notification". In addition, there is one sentence of code that
encompasses two or more sub-purposes, such as “We go directly to the sales or deployment
(the contact person) to organise a meeting when there comes a temporary but emergent
customer’s complaint". It is divided into “Fix customers’ complaints" and “Cooperate among
multiple functional departments". We conduct a second round of selective coding to group
similar purposes and divide mixed purposes. The same holds for RQ 4 concerning challenges.
Lastly, to connect our results concerning the four RQs coherently, we conduct axial
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coding for RQ 1, RQ 3 and RQ 4. We link the existing communication channels with their
purposes. We link the top 10 challenges with their purposes as well. We demonstrate an
example of our coding phase including interview snippet, open coding, selective coding and
axial coding in Table 2.
Table 2: Example of coding phase
Interview snippet Open coding Selective coding
(possibly iterative)
Axial coding
Q: “What are the com-
mon purposes to facili-
tate communication con-
cerning safety analysis?"
A: “...we have to exchange
(safety analysis) informa-
tion with our parent com-
pany...but the documents
are always missing ... The
functions are inherited,
detailed architecture de-
sign documents are kept
by them ... safety analy-
sis cannot be done with-
out considering interfaces
with original products ..."
We exchange safety
analysis information
with our parent com-
pany. The documents
are missing. The func-
tions are inherited.
Detailed architecture
design documents are
kept by them. Safety
analysis cannot be
done without consider-
ing interfaces with the
original products.
Channels: Documen-
tation.
Purposes: Derive
safety requirements.
Share knowledge.
CHANNEL_Documentation
< − >
PURPOSES_Derive
safety require-
ments_Share knowledge.
Q: “Have you noticed
some challenges in these
communication chan-
nels?"
A: “...more importantly,
we do care about the
confidentiality. We cate-
gorised the data related
to safety analysis with
different confidential
levels. High confidential
data requires relevant
authorities to read or
transmit ..."
We care about con-
fidentiality problem.
We categorise the
safety analysis re-
lated information with
different confidential
levels. High confiden-
tial levels’ data need
authorities to read and
transmit.
Purposes: Transfer
safety requirements.
Challenges: Trans-
mission of confidential
information.
Authority problems.
PURPOSES _Transfer
safety requirements
< − >
CHALLENGE_Confidential
information_Authority
problems.
For quantitative data concerning RQ 1, we choose pure numbers of participants to rep-
resent the utilisation of each communication channel. For quantitative data concerning RQ
2, in the first round, the participants scored the frequencies of the occurrences of each com-
munication channel. The scale ranges from 1-4 times per day to 1-4 times per year. We
consider that only the pure numbers in the surveys might show memory lapses [7], the same
as by asking the interviewees, a direct observation is necessary to validate the results.
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5. Results
5.1. RQ1: Which communication channels are adopted for safety analysis?
Figure 4: Communication channels in safety analysis
As we can see in Figure 4, we find 9 communication channels during safety analysis, which
are meetings, personal discussion, internal communication software (private), email, tele-
phone, documentation, project coordination tools, training (including tutorial) and boards.
Few participants mentioned the use of social communication software. However, considering
that it is a rare and non-regulated case1, we discussed with an expert in company A and
decided not to include it in our results. We summarise the results as follows:
Meeting: All the 39 participants (100%) mentioned meeting as a main communication
channel during safety analysis. A meeting is defined as a gathering of two or more people
that has been convened for the purpose of achieving a common goal through verbal com-
munication, such as sharing information or reaching an agreement. It may take the form
of face-to-face or virtually, as mediated by communications technology, such as a telephone
conference call, a Skype conference call or a video-conference [31] [32]. When performing
safety analysis, the meetings include planning meetings, review meetings and requirements
audit/assessment meetings. The joined members are invited by a meeting organiser, such as
a safety analysis moderator. The communication might produce work products as outputs,
1We consider that it is due to a culture difference between Europe and Asia. More descriptions are shown
in Section 6.2.
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such as relevant documentation including safety plan or safety requirements implementation
decisions.
Project coordination tool: 37 participants (94.9%) mentioned using project coordina-
tion tools as a main communication channel during safety analysis. Project coordination
tools aim to increase group awareness of current tasks and issues and provide a means for
tracking progress and discussing next steps [15]. Jira is the most popular one in our research
context, together with the interfaces to other requirements management tools like Doors to
keep the multiple levels and the traceability of safety requirements. Company A, company
A1, company A2 and company A3 are using an Application Lifecycle Management (ALM)
of IBM Rational Team Concert2. In daily work, employees can trace the progresses of safety
analysis transparently and provide feedback or comments timely. In other communication
channels, such as meetings or personal discussion, project coordination tools provide an up-
to-date information, such as the implementation of a safety requirement.
Documentation: 36 participants (92.3%) mentioned documentation as a main communi-
cation channel during safety analysis. According to the functional safety standards, safety
analysis requires a large amount of documentation, such as safety analysis instrumentations,
safety analysis execution plans and safety analysis audit/assessment reports. To record pro-
cesses and results of safety analysis clearly, the employees have to rely on these documents.
Telephone: 33 participants (84.6%) mentioned the use of the traditional telephone. Even
though other modern communication software is springing up, most of the employees believe
that telephone is more reliable for local communication and just as easy to use as in daily
life [33] [34]. We obtained a novel channel calling a telephone call via Skype in our research
context. Company A links the telephone numbers with the Skype accounts. It enhances the
work efficiency. For example, when someone is on the way among different work places, he
or she can keep the communication via various mobile terminals, such as mobile phone or
tablet personal computer.
Email: 32 participants (82.1%) mentioned the use of email. As an asynchronous commu-
nication channel, when the issues are not emergent and might involve not only one person,
email provides time to structure the information for communication [35]. Concerning safety
analysis, email threads and the contents of emails are traceable. The traceability constitutes
an advantage of using email. However, using email is not fully positive during safety analy-
sis. Email can record the process of discussion, yet the practitioners during safety analysis
do not prefer recording their discussion, rather only documenting their results. In addition,
although using emails seems traceable, there needs a lot of efforts to search for the relevant
information.
Personal discussion: 28 participants (71.8%) mentioned personal discussion as a commu-
nication channel during safety analysis. Personal discussion is a form of informal face-to-face
communication. It happens spontaneously and less supported by communication technology
[9]. When performing safety analysis, an internal communication prefers mostly using per-
sonal discussions. It can ensure a correct understanding and a timely feedback. To perform
safety analysis in modern software development, personal discussion needs attentions and
2https://arcadsoftware.de/produkte/rtc-rational-team-concert/
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the effectiveness of it will influence the quality of safety analysis to a great extent.
Training (including tutorial): 19 participants (48.7%) mentioned training including
tutorials as a communication channel. Training is a traditional way to enhance personal
competence and share knowledge in industries [36]. In terms of safety analysis, the educa-
tion institutes sometimes lack such courses, especially the practical experiences in developing
safety-critical systems. A training of safety analysis or functional safety standards is a nor-
mal way to cultivate employees. However, some of the employees are already experts from
other relevant positions or departments in industries, such as product development or quality
assurance departments. They have already a deep experience. Thus, not all the participants
have to take part in the training.
Internal communication software (private): 15 participants (38.5%) mentioned inter-
nal communication software as a communication channel. We consider only the internal
communication software that features a private chat, since not all the software featuring
group or public chats in our research context (company A uses Skype that supports public
chat, while company A2 uses Microsoft Office Communicator (OCS) that does not support
public chat). It is a relative new communication channel popularising in the last decade. It
integrates functions like a real-time notification, documents transformation and even meeting
organisation [12]. Even though, the results indicate that internal communication software
is not as much used during safety analysis as in other areas, such as software development
[15]. We speculate that concerning each single function, the employees still have a better
choice for achieving the purposes of safety analysis, such as for a real-time communication,
telephone is more reliable to get in touch.
Boards: 6 participants (15.4%) mentioned the use of boards. Boards, as communication
channels, have been popularly used in industries and are becoming a tool during project
management, such as whiteboards [37], in modern development processes. They are placed
near the work areas. Some of them demonstrate the state-of-the-art or contributions in
terms of safety analysis, such as a process flowchart of safety analysis in product develop-
ment or the developed interfaces in safety analysis and relevant tools. In particular, when
external experts or customers come to visit the company, boards are an intuitive way to
show competitiveness.
5.2. RQ2: How frequently used are safety analysis communication channels?
Meetings are mostly held ranging from 1-4 times per week (18 out of 39 respondents,
46.2%) to 1-4 times per month (18 out of 39 respondents, 46.2%). Personal discussion
happens 1-4 times per week (18 out of 27 respondents, 66.7% ). Internal communication
software is used mostly 1-4 times per week (11 out of 15 respondents, 73.3%). Email (18
out of 32 respondents, 56.3%) and telephone (23 out of 33 respondents, 69.7%) are also
frequently used 1-4 times per week. Documentation is written, read or managed 1-4 times
per week (27 out of 36 respondents, 75%). Project coordination tools are in use 1-4 times
per day (36 out of 37 respondents, 97.3%). Training is established 1-4 times per year with
100% respondents’ rate. Boards are possibly to be noticed 1-4 times per week (4 out of 6
respondents, 66.7%). In summary, most of the communication channels (7 out of 9) are in
use for safety analysis at least every week. Project coordination tools are in use for safety
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analysis everyday, while training (including tutorial) concerning safety analysis is mostly
held every year. In particular, the same number of participants (18 participants) mention
that the meetings are held between 1-4 times per week and 1-4 times per month. We discuss
this point with an expert in company A and consider the reason to be the distribution of
the company. For local projects, it is possible to establish necessary meetings. However,
the distributed projects occupy also a large percentage in our research context. It is almost
impossible for the employees, who are in distributed locations, to find a common time slot,
such as in Germany, China, and USA. In these cases, meetings cannot be so frequently held
at a 1-4 times per week rate and other communication channels are in use instead.
Figure 5: Usage frequencies of the 9 communication channel (The numbers in bars mean the number of
participants)
5.3. RQ 3: Which are the purposes of safety analysis communication channels?
We address overall 28 purposes of 9 communication channels during safety analysis, as
we can see in Table 3.
1. Transfer safety requirements (in). To transfer safety requirements internally, the em-
ployees use meetings, documentation and project coordination tools. They discuss safety
requirements in the form of meetings to keep it formal and possible to be established among
multiple functional departments. They record the safety requirements in official documen-
tation and project coordination tools to support daily communication.
2. Transfer safety requirements (ex). To transfer safety requirements externally, meetings
and documentation are implemented. However, contrary to the internal transfer of safety
requirements, project coordination tools mostly have a limitation on permissions to external
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members. Some of the customers send the safety requirements per email, which seems to be
non-regulated due to a lack of format of constructing safety requirements and an acceptance
process of safety requirements.
3. Derive safety requirement. A formal and thorough discussion is necessary to derive cor-
rect and complete safety requirements. Thus, meeting is the most effective way with respect
to the number of participants and time.
4. Clarify safety requirements internally. Many communication channels are applicable to
clarify safety requirements internally, which include meetings, personal discussion, internal
communication software (private), telephone, documentation and project coordination tools.
It depends on the impact degree and scope of misunderstandings. A meeting is ideal for clari-
fying safety requirements with a severe impact. Personal discussion, internal communication
software (private) and telephone are better for an individual clarification. Documentation
is used to record an official clarification, while project coordination tools are specific for a
clarification in an open mode.
5. Clarify safety requirement externally. An official and reliable communication channel is
extremely important to clarify safety requirements externally. Thus, meetings and docu-
mentation are the most appropriate channels. Email has also been used for an explanation
at an early stage.
6. Implement safety requirements. The developers should implement safety requirements to
their development. In terms of accountability, they prefer to execute it through meetings
and documentation. The generation of ideas may happen through personal discussion.
7. Trace safety requirements (bi). According to the standards, safety requirements should
satisfy a bi-directional traceability [38]. Project coordination tools give the employees a di-
rect overview. However, to preserve them long-term, documentation is needed. In addition,
some project coordination tools do not support multiple level safety requirements, such as
Jira.
8. Planning. To perform safety analysis planning, a planning meeting is a popular way,
together with a safety plan as a work product. The execution process is shown in a project
coordination tool.
9. Regular discussion. It includes regular meetings in the development team or personal
discussion among team members. Sometimes the team members use internal communication
software.
10. Demonstrate periodic analysis results. The safety analysis results should be demon-
strated periodically to promote development. The results are transmitted automatically in
the project coordination tools. The safety analysts demonstrate the results via the meeting
and record them in the documentation.
11. Demonstrate periodic V&V results. It is the same way with purposes 10. The accep-
tance criteria for safety verification and validation are recorded in the documentation and
the review process is running in a meeting with a record in the project coordination tools.
12. Review. There is a regular review meeting held at the end of a project. The results are
recorded in the review report and in a project coordination tool at the same time.
13. Monitor the status. Some practitioners facilitate communication for monitoring the
status of safety analysis. The project coordination tool is the best way for monitoring the
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status in terms of a convenience and completeness overview.
14. Fix resources/supply problems. Safety analysis sometimes faces the problems concerning
a lack of resources or supply. The resources or suppliers are inside the company, yet among
different subsidiaries or multiple functional departments. Meeting and personal discussion
are the normal ways to fix such official but less frequent issues.
15. Fix customers’ complaints. The employees receive the customers’ complaints mostly
through emails. Solving the problems is achieved through meetings.
16. Establish commitments and make decisions. The commitments are established among
various roles, while the decisions are made in a formally strategic way. Meeting is the most
suitable method.
17. Improve processes and techniques. The processes and techniques of safety analysis are
continuously developed. No matter how subtle the changes are, these changes have to be
considered and discussed systematically and transparently [39]. Meeting can gather omni-
farious opinions and perform allocations from an overall perspective.
18. Fix temporary problems, conflicts and obstacles. There are many unforeseeable and
even tiny problems, conflicts and obstacles during safety analysis, possible communication
channels are meeting, personal discussion, internal communication software, email and tele-
phone. The selection of the channels depends on concrete issues.
19. Cooperate among multiple functional departments. A meeting is possible to be or-
ganised across multiple functional departments. The employees might also communicate
through personal discussion, when they have a good relationship privately. The employees
are also using internal communication software, email and telephone to communication with
multiple functional departments.
20. Help to understand the standards. The activities and artifacts of performing safety
analysis have to satisfy the standards. Not everyone has a solid background. To understand
the standards, safety managers might introduce briefly in a meeting. More than that, the
employees could ask relevant experts through personal discussion. To this end, training is
popular in safety-critical companies to illustrate the standards systematically.
21. Realise real-time notifications. Some issues related to safety analysis are emergent, such
as a serious customers’ complaint, which might influence an ongoing delivery. In this case,
the employees usually go directly to find the colleague (personal discussion), using internal
communication software or telephone. Some project coordination tools provide a timely
notification function in connection with email.
22. Provide feedback and comments. The employees are able to provide a timely feedback
or comments through personal discussion, internal communication software, and telephone.
Email is better for a clear explanation, while project coordination tools make the feedback
and comments open to other employees.
23. Enhance group cohesion. Some communication channels among safety analysis and
other stakeholders enhance safety-critical industries’ cohesion, such as internal communica-
tion software and project coordination tools. Training is especially useful for new employees.
24. Discuss off topics. The contents of off topics might influence the safety analysis posi-
tively or negatively. The employees mainly use internal communication software or directly
personal discussion.
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25. Share knowledge. Knowledge sharing is considered important in safety-critical systems
[40], such as general safety knowledge or in-depth safety analysis information. It occurs
through meeting, personal discussion, telephone, documentation, training and boards.
26. Transfer documents or links. The safety analysis related documents are mostly saved on
a server. Yet, a small change of information management system as well as the complicated
hierarchy of folders make some documents more difficult to be found or take more time than
asking the responsible colleague. Thus, the employees might use communication channels to
transfer them or their link. Internal communication software is a convenient way to share a
link or an address, while email is able to send chunky files and keep track of the documents.
27. Enhance safety culture. Safety culture reflects the general attitude and approaches to
safety and risk management [2]. Safety culture is difficult to evaluate [41]. Documents are
required by the standards. The satisfaction of such requirements of documents determines
the organisation’s safety assurance capability. It influences the safety culture. Responsibili-
ties of specific roles, such as safety manager, are important to meeting the standards. Thus,
a training of standards is necessary for remaining a good safety culture. Some participants
mentioned boards as a good way to enhance safety culture through daily work, such as
hanging out recent contributions.
28. Demonstration (external). Boards are also popular to demonstrate the safety analysis
capability of the organisations to external experts or customers. An intentional demonstra-
tion for a possible cooperation is conducted in meetings.
Table 3: Purposes
Meeting Personal
discus-
sion
Csw. Email Tel. Doc. Project
coordi-
nation
tool
Training Boards
1. Transfer safety requirements (in) X X X
2. Transfer safety requirements (ex) X X X
3. Derive safety requirements X
4. Clarify safety requirements (in) X X X X X X
5. Clarify safety requirements (ex) X X X
6. Implement safety requirements X X X
7. Trace safety requirements (bi) X X
8. Planning X X X
9. Regular discussion X X X
10. Demonstrate periodic analysis results X X X
11. Demonstrate periodic V&V results X X X
12. Review X X X
13. Monitor the status X
14. Fix resources/supply problems X X
15. Fix customers’ complaints X X
16. Establish commitments and make decisions X
17. Improve processes or techniques X
18. Fix temp. problems, conflicts and obstacles X X X X X
19. Cooperate among multiple functional departments X X X X X
20. Help to understand the standards X X X
21. Realise real-time notifications X X X X
22. Provide feedback and comments X X X X X
23. Enhance group cohesion X X X
24. Discuss bordered or off topics X X
25. Share knowledge X X X X X X
26. Transfer documents or links X X
27. Enhance safety culture X X X
28. Demonstration (external) X X
Csw. is internal communication software. Tel. is telephone. Doc. is documentation. V&V is verification and validation. In means internal, while
ex means external. Bi means bi-direction.
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5.4. RQ4: What are the challenges when using safety analysis communication
channels?
5.4.1. The Top 10 Challenges
We derive the top 10 challenges across 9 communication channels from interviews and
check the results by a safety expert in company A. We list them as follows.
1. The communication of sensitive or confidential information should be monitored.
The results of safety analysis are mostly sensitive and confidential, since they encompass
products in details, which influence a safe operation and end-use of products. Commu-
nication channels have to keep the information confidential, which includes ensuring that
sensitive and confidential information is properly stored, maintained, secured, and accessi-
ble to those who need it [42] [43]. One interviewee mentioned: “We categorised the data
(information) related to safety analysis with different confidentiality levels. Higher confiden-
tial data (information) requires relevant authorities to read and transmit. Yet, we do not
regulate the verbal communication, including using social communication software to discuss
the information. These information is not under monitor and control." We note one factor
concerning initiative leakage (a lack of regulations) of sensitive or confidential information
through communication channels rather than passive leakage (a poor security and privacy
assurance mechanism). As one participant mentioned: “We always avoid some non-regulated
channels to transmit confidential and sensitive data (information), such as using e-mail to
send safety requirements, even though some customers do this. We actually do not know
clearly what is such regulations, just following our experiences." To face this factor, or-
ganisation should establish relevant regulations on the communication channels, especially
on the verbal channels, when performing safety analysis. The employees can understand
clearly which sensitive and confidential information is able to transmit by which communi-
cation channels. Moreover, an alternative to verbal communication is recommended when
performing safety analysis, such as text transmission.
2. Some safety analysis information is fragmented.
The fragmentation will cause misunderstandings on safety analysis information. This hap-
pens particularly in text-based communication channels, such as safety analysis related-
documentation and internal communication software. As one interviewee mentioned: “Mostly
we can find out the safety-analysis relevant documents on the server. But sometimes the in-
formation is difficult to be understood or also possibly lacking some critical information,
maybe not updated. The files are uploaded by authors themselves with no more reviews and
even regular maintenance." There is a specific role responsible for technical documents’
maintenance in industries. However, the maintenance for online documents seems weak.
Moreover, for the synchronous communication channels like internal communication soft-
ware. One interviewee said: “To save time, there are too many personal abbreviations. That
makes us confused and influences some emergent issues."
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3. Some safety analysis information is inconsistent.
The tools such as project coordinate tools and safety analysis tools are updated frequently.
However, other recordings do not keep the same space. As one interviewee mentioned: “In
Jira and Doors, which we are using for recording safety requirements, there are all the up-
dated safety requirements. But sometimes we use also doc files to record the results from
safety analysis firstly and do not use those directly. The update (of official requirements
documents) has a determined time point, which is not in a timely manner." A real-time
consistency seems important for the set of safety analysis related tools. In this paragraph,
we focus on the contents, while the forth challenge focuses on the trigger time.
4. Some communication channels concerning safety analysis are asynchronous, when they
should be synchronous.
Some communication channels are considered to be synchronous, such as Skype or tele-
phone. However, they are not in our case. One interviewee mentioned: “When there is a
temporary meeting, I will check if this colleague is online (Skype), then call him (or her). It
works mostly. But once, I got an emergent customer complaint regarding our safety analy-
sis, we need to find a colleague immediately, he was not online and could not be reached by
telephone. I decided to go directly to his office and found him." The asynchronous channels
will hinder some emergent issues such as production and delivery and might cause fatalities.
5. The communication channels concerning safety analysis lack tool support.
Tools often put a limit to the strategies that can be adopted [2]. For effective communica-
tions, tools are important, especially the interfaces among different tools. When performing
safety analysis, non-verbal communication takes an increasingly major part of it. An effective
tool chain ensures the information’s correctness, clearness, completeness and synchronous.
However, the integration between safety analysis and functional development still lacks tool
supports. Various organisational structures have various communication channels and tools.
The new techniques are changing too fast to arrange an immediately effective use of them.
As one interviewee said: “We start to use ALM (from IBM) for project management, but the
interfaces (with the existing management tools) are not finished. The traceability is too poor."
The company has to consider an immediately developed interface with other safety analysis
tools, when they introduce a new project management tool. Otherwise, when buying a new
tool, a feasible interface to the existing toolchain should be considered by the company. As
one interviewee mentioned: “APIS IQ-FMEA is a powerful tool that we used for performing
FMEA. We have used it for many years and believe in it. Currently, we are considering
to use a safety information and activity management tool. A lot of companies have intro-
duced their tools. But our first criteria is if it has a feasible interface with APIS IQ-FMEA."
6. Developers might misunderstand the information from safety experts.
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When the products to be developed have novel functions, there will be misunderstandings
between functional developers and safety experts. One interviewee said: “It is no problem
when developing old functions like ECU (electronic control unit). But these years we are
starting a new functional module NCU (new energy control unit). The traditional safety
experts, who have functional development experiences only on developing ECU, lack the new
knowledge to understand detailed development." The communication channels which support
knowledge sharing might be helpful in this case.
7. There are language, geographic and culture barriers in the communication channels.
In terms of language, most of the companies in our context use English as the official
language. Nevertheless, some professional terms concerning safety analysis are not uniform,
such as incorrect verbs like operate safety analysis instead of perform safety analysis. This
happens in the text-based as well as verbal communication channels. In terms of geographic,
distributed locations interfere experience sharing. As one interviewee mentioned: “We send
our colleagues, who perform safety analysis to other countries once a year to enhance com-
munication and collaboration, but it works better for new employees. They want to learn
new techniques and former experiences. For safety experts, we prefer that the execution of
safety analysis should be suitable for our own environment or context. Different countries
have different requirements and problems." The basic knowledge has been well transmitted.
However, the practical experiences are less shared and worse discussed. The knowledge shar-
ing of safety analysis should not stop in the technique level, rather with more real-life cases.
In terms of culture, distributed companies keep detailed safety analysis results and avoid
to communicate them. There is a lack of trust among different cultures [44]. The parent
company keeps some details, such as architecture design, of development and even safety
analysis. When the subsidiaries inherit some function modules, they lack such details to
perform a thorough and systematic safety analysis. Regulations among different countries
might be a reason.
8. The members from functional departments are unwilling to share safety knowledge with
non-functional departments.
Functional (including functional safety) departments believe in their knowledge on develop-
ment and safety of products. As one expert from the functional department said: “We don’t
see the necessity to do this." We call this stereotype in groupthink theory3. This challenge
exists during safety analysis and is specifically important for developing and ensuring a safe
product [46]. An interviewee said: “We do not think that other departments like purchasing
or sales could help us a lot on developing a safe product. We know more and detailed on the
product. For one project, we were required to train them with some general safety knowledge.
3Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon, which was introduced by Janis in 1971 [45]. It is a linear model of how
seven antecedents (cohesion, group insulation, impartial leader, lack of norms, homogeneous, high stress from external threats,
temporarily low self-esteem) increase the likelihood of premature concurrence seeking, which leads to eight psychological
symptoms (illusion of invulnerability, collective rationalisations, belief in inherent morality of the group, stereotypes of out-
groups, direct pressure on dissenters, self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, self-appointed mindguards).
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We do not know how much it works. They also look unwilling." In terms of safety knowl-
edge sharing, the functional departments (including functional safety) should appreciate the
needs and expectation of other job roles. In addition, a lack of continuous learning and per-
sonal development processes reduce the passions of non-functional departments’ employees
to learn safety-analysis related knowledge, as one interviewee mentioned: “Safety analysis
is not my main job, if just for this project and it does not help for future, we actually do
not want to use too much time on it." To this end, we should notice if the information is
spread widely enough. As one expert said: “Sometimes the employees are forced to share
the safety knowledge." A lack of initiative makes the knowledge sharing becoming superficial.
9. The storage, authority, regulation and monitoring problems on the transmitted safety
analysis information.
In terms of the storage of safety analysis information, one interviewee mentioned: “We
have a central information management system on the server, but the safety analysis data
(information) or files are not clearly classified. Some (of them) are mixed with other pro-
cess documents." The quality of transmitted information interleaves with the effectiveness
of communication channels. The company should consider to establish a safety information
management system to be separated with other information. In addition, the tools of in-
formation storage are important. An expert said: “The process of our data (information)
storage is following the tools, not using tools to support process." Thus, a suitable tool for
safety information storage is needed, especially for modern safety-critical systems with a
huge amount of data. As one interviewee mentioned: “The simulation data for autonomous
driving system are thousands of giga bytes. It is relative difficult to find them when there is
a migration happened 10 years before." In terms of authority, one interviewee said: “In the
information management system, we classify the files into different levels of authorities. But
it is difficult to divide levels of safety requirements in Jira." The authority should be noticed
not only in the information management system, but also in the project management tool.
In terms of regulation, some feedback are: “We are not clear about the regulations, just big
sizes of files cannot be sent privately." We notice that there are some hidden regulations
on transmitting safety sensitive information. However, these regulations are not clearly and
obviously announced. In terms of monitoring problems, the safety analysis information are
monitored by an IT department as the same with other company level sensitive information.
As one interviewee mentioned: “We do have a monitor group that monitors and controls the
transformation of marked files. The high severity files have different kinds of mark. It could
be traced by IT department." The monitor of safety analysis information does work inside
the company, but still needs enhancement.
10. There is a lack of technical documentation to support communication.
Safety analysis should be performed at the system level [2]. The detailed system description
documents are necessary but sometimes not available. One interviewee mentioned: “Some
products are developed on the basis of the original product. The functions are inherited.
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The detailed architecture design documents are kept by the original company or department.
The execution of safety analysis cannot only be performed on new function modules with-
out considering interfaces with original products. A systematic impact causes risks." This
might be caused by the culture (as we indicate in challenge 7), the authority problem (as
we mentioned in challenge 9) of subsidiaries, or an incomplete and fragment record of safety
analysis information (as we mention in challenge 2). Nevertheless, safety analysis related
documentation should consider communication [47].
5.4.2. A Mapping between Purposes and Challenges
Table 4: Purposes versus Challenges
Purposes vs. Challenges 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Transfer safety requirements (in) X X
2. Transfer safety requirements (ex) X X
3. Derive safety requirements X X X
4. Clarify safety requirements (in) X X
5. Clarify safety requirements (ex) X X X
6. Implement safety requirements X X
7. Trace safety requirements (bi) X
8. Planning X
9. Regular discussion X
10. Demonstrate periodic analysis results X X
11. Demonstrate periodic V&V results X X
12. Review X
13. Monitor the status X X
14. Fix resources / supply problems X
15. Fix customers’ complaints X X
16. Establish commitments and make decisions X X
17. Improve processes or techniques X
18. Fix temp. problems, conflicts and obstacles X
19. Cooperate among multiple functional departments X X
20. Help to understand the standards X X
21. Realise real-time notification X
22. Provide feedback and comments X X
23. Enhance group cohesion X
24. Discuss boards line or off topics X
25. Share knowledge X X
26. Transfer documents or links X X
27. Enhance safety culture X
28. Demonstration (external) X
In. csw (private) is internal communication software. Tel. is telephone. Doc. is documentation. V&V is verification and validation. In means
internal, while ex means external.
Based on the results from the interviews, we map the purposes with challenges, as shown
in Table 4. The first line depicts the numbers of the top 10 challenges, while the first column
depicts the purposes.
Considering challenge 1: The communication of sensitive or confidential information should
be monitored. It happens often when the practitioners transfer and demonstrate safety
analysis related information (purpose 1, 2, 24, 26, 28). The practitioners, who use the
communication channels for achieving these purposes, should notice challenge 1. Other
communication channels are better to avoid transferring sensitive or confidential informa-
tion.
Considering challenge 2: Some safety analysis information is fragmented. The incomplete
and fragment information occur through almost all the 9 communication channels, especially
for demonstrating information (purpose 10, 11). Documentation, project coordination tools,
email and internal communication software should keep safety analysis related information
as complete as possible. When facing resource or supply problems, the provided information
from them should notice completeness (purpose 14).
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Considering challenge 3: Some safety analysis information is inconsistent. When the practi-
tioners clarify the safety requirements (purpose 3, 4, 5) or demonstrate the results (purpose
10, 11), the communication channels should keep consistent information to avoid misunder-
standings. Thus, the consistency among the recordings of meetings, the archived documen-
tation and the project coordination tools seem important.
Considering challenge 4: Some communication channels concerning safety analysis are asyn-
chronous, when they should be synchronous. It is extremely important when there is a need
for real-time notification and timely monitoring (purpose 13, 15, 22). Thus, telephone, inter-
nal communication software should be able to reach a specific person when he/she is on-site.
Considering challenge 5: The communication channels concerning safety analysis lack tool
support. A tool is necessary for tracing safety requirements (purpose 7), monitoring status
(purpose 13) and providing feedback (purpose 22). The temporary problems necessitate
tools to support recordings (purpose 18). We should arrange or design efficient tools and
their interfaces as well.
Considering challenge 6: Developers might misunderstand the information from safety ex-
perts. The misunderstanding might occur between developers and safety experts when they
use communication channels internally to derive, clarify, implement, discuss, review and
share the safety analysis related information (purpose 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 25). The understanding
with respect to standards show also bias (purpose 20). The practitioners need to consider
the understandability and an obstacle-free communication among multiple functional de-
partments.
Considering challenge 7: There are geographic, language and culture barriers in the com-
munication channels. When the industries aim to enhance group cohesion and share safety
knowledge (purpose 24, 26), the communication channels, such as internal communication
software, training and boards, might reduce the interferences from geographic, language and
culture bias. To face customers or clarify safety analysis externally, it might happen in a
multiple geographical distribution (purpose 5, 15). The relevant communication channels,
such as meeting, should consider it.
Considering challenge 8: The members from functional departments are unwilling to share
safety knowledge with non-functional departments. The communication channels regard-
ing the cooperation among multiple functional departments (purpose 20) should avoid this
challenge. For example, during meetings, a friendly environment for discussion is necessary.
Personal discussion, such as by using internal communication software, email and telephone,
is encouraged among multiple functional departments. When clarifying safety requirements
externally (purpose 5), this challenge may happen due to a diverse knowledge background.
When planning safety analysis (purpose 8), non-functional departments are keeping silence,
as well as when improving processes or techniques (purpose 17). To enhance safety culture
(purpose 27), non-functional departments should be included.
Considering challenge 9: The storage, authority, regulation and monitoring problems on the
transmitted safety analysis information. To transfer safety requirements (purpose 1, 2, 26),
storage, authority, regulation and monitoring are necessary. To establish commitment and
make decisions (purpose 16), relevant regulations are needed. The fulfillment of standards
should follow regulations (purpose 20). The feedback and comments need to be stored (pur-
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pose 22).
Considering challenge 10: There is a lack of technical documentation to support commu-
nication. The derive, implementation and decision making of safety requirements need a
clear documentation to be understood by multiple functional departments and support an
effective communication among them (purpose 3, 6, 16, 19).
6. Discussion
The main benefit of our article is that we investigate the general topic concerning com-
munication channels in a concrete context concerning the execution of safety analysis. We
aim to arouse the awareness of practitioners concerning safety analysis on their commu-
nication. The results are multiple: (1) we find 9 communication channels during safety
analysis; (2) most of them happen 1-4 times per week; (3) we investigate 28 purposes of
these 9 communication channels and (4) the top 10 challenges across these 9 communication
channels.
To compare with related work, Storey et al. [15] found around twenty communication
channels during software development. When performing safety analysis, the number of
communication channels are smaller. In our article, we found nine communication channels
during safety analysis to define a scope. We conjecture that (1) safety analysis is an activity
within software development, (2) the confidentiality concerning sensitive safety-related data
limit the number of possible communication channels, especially informal communication
channels.
Kraut et al. [9] mentioned that the usage frequency can show the importance of commu-
nication, which helps process improvements when performing safety analysis. In this article,
we calculate the usage frequencies of the 9 communication channels during safety analysis
to raise the importance of communication during safety analysis.
Vilela et al. [6] proposed more than 11 pros that an effective communication in safety
analysis can bring, such as reducing errors in requirements specification or helping design.
However, to achieve an effective communication, the realisation of communication purposes
is first and foremost. The existing research concerning communication purposes seem poor.
We conjecture the reason might be that the general communication purposes distribute
too wide-ranging. However, during safety analysis, the communication purposes can be
accounted.
The challenges of communication concerning safety issues were mentioned in plenty of
studies, which are either accident reports [11] or in terms of general organisation manage-
ment [7]. The summarised communication challenges in software development are more than
twenty [15]. However, to the best of our knowledge, few research focus on the communi-
cation challenges, which might cause unsafe issues, during the execution of safety analysis
in organisation management. In this article, we explore these challenges to provide hints of
problems to avoid during safety analysis.
“Being a good communicator is one thing. Knowing what to communicate is much
more important." [48] (P. 52, Conboy et al.)
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To see the results in this article, given the aforementioned opinion, we highlight the major
contribution of our results as communication purposes (RQ 3). During our research, a lot
of the popular communication channels are used across various areas, not only for safety
analysis. The challenges are summarised with similar manifestations, such as incomplete
information and asynchronous implementation, but they are totally different in essence in
terms of causalities, effects as well as solutions. Some of the challenges cannot map into
safety analysis directly. We believe that a purpose during the communication in safety
analysis determines why and what to communicate. Communication makes sense when the
people achieve their communication purpose.
Thus, in this article, first, we map the 9 communication channels (RQ 1) with the 28
purposes. Within these 28 purposes, each one has 1 to 6 possible selections of commu-
nication channels to achieve it. For instance, to derive safety requirements (purpose 3),
to establish commitments and make decisions (purpose 16) and to improve processes and
techniques (purpose 17), the practitioners show only the use of meetings. To clarify safety
requirements internally (purpose 4) and to share knowledge (purpose 25), each purpose has
6 communication channels as possible selections in practice. Second, we map the top 10
challenges (RQ 4) with their 28 purposes. The challenges rely heavily on their purposes and
have different manifestations on each channel. For instance, “the communication of sensi-
tive and confidential information should be monitored" (challenge 1) when “transfer safety
requirements" (purpose 1, 2), as shown in Table 4, rather than whether the practitioners
use meetings, email, documentation or project coordination tools, as shown in Table 3.
In addition to the major contribution on communication purposes, we demonstrate firstly
the state-of-the-art in terms of the types (RQ 1) of the existing communication channels.
The number is not huge comparing with existing communication channels in other areas
such as social media [12].
Meeting is a dominant one during safety analysis, which is able to achieve 20 out of
28 purposes. Especially, three purposes (3, 16, 17) can only be reached by meetings. The
practitioners prefer to use meetings in traditional development processes which advocate
formality as well as in modern development processes which aim to increase cooperation
and communication. Meetings are possible for them both.
Project coordination tool, documentation, telephone and email are four popular commu-
nication channels in organisation management, as well as when performing safety analysis.
They are able to reach 11 purposes, 12 purposes, 6 purposes and 7 purposes in safety analysis,
respectively.
The importance of personal discussion is an outstanding result in our study. 71.8%
participants mentioned that they are using it during safety analysis. It can achieve 11
out of 28 purposes. Based on our original conjecture, personal discussion might happen
occasionally and especially rarely during safety analysis. Safety analysis is considered to be
a technically in-depth activity, which needs an official communication or at least, more time
to prepare. Comparing with other 8 communication channels, personal discussion seems to
be the most unregulated one, which is extremely difficult to control, monitor and trace. We
missed noticing its necessity. Yet, the results caught our attention.
Internal communication software is a novel channel since last decade. Even though it has
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been moderately mentioned in our context, the results show still its powerful functionalities
that it can reach 9 purposes during safety analysis.
Training is a concentrated way to enhance communication concerning safety analysis.
It can reach 4 purposes. Apart from the basic training for new employees, some specific
training programs, or even expert-level training, should be arranged.
Boards are familiar for industries. It can achieve 3 purposes. Due to the modern devel-
opment processes, such as whiteboards [37] from Kanban, the practitioners could consider
extending the boards’ functionalities, particularly during safety analysis.
To strength the existing communication channels further, the usage frequencies (RQ 2)
in practice can demonstrate their importances. We set 4 scales including 1-4 times per day,
1-4 times, per week, 1-4 times per month and 1-4 times per year. Generally, 7 out of 9
communication channels are used 1-4 times per week. Project coordination tools are used
1-4 times per day. We discussed it with a safety expert and he said: “To start an (safety
analysis) activity, we check the state as the first step, because we just switched from other
tasks. Project coordination tool (Jira) is convenient, complete and intuitive." A general
overview is necessary before facilitating an issue. The project coordination tool is easy to
use and it provides almost all the information or ways to get these information in a project.
Training concerning safety analysis happens 1-4 times per year. From our viewpoint, it is
reasonable.
As an initial step to investigate communication channels during safety analysis, we con-
centrate on the top 10 challenges (RQ 4) based on analysing our qualitative data and a
final check by an expert in company A. Several of them show similar problems as in gen-
eral communication channels, such as incomplete and fragmented information. Yet, during
safety analysis, we notice that the fragmentation of information are in high severities and
may cause fatalities. The completeness is not dominant. As one expert mentioned: “ 90%
(incomplete) information sometimes is fully sufficient for solving the problems during safety
analysis. But when the information is complete but fragmented, such as safety cases, which
are spread over different tools, that seems serious." Geographical problems are also popu-
lar in general communication channels. Developers cannot get in touch to exchange states.
However, during safety analysis, it influences not only the information transmission, but also
safety knowledge sharing. These challenges need separate considerations. Other challenges
are specifically existing in the communication channels during safety analysis, such as confi-
dentiality concerning safety analysis information and groupthink including unwillingness to
share safety analysis information with non-technical members.
6.1. Implications
For theory, RQ 1, RQ 2 and RQ 3 might provide implications. As far as we know,
there are no reported results on the existing communication channels as well as their usage
frequencies and purposes during safety analysis. An overview of communication channels’
scope (Figure 1 and Figure 4) helps a further investigation on challenges. The using fre-
quency of each communication channel (Figure 5) shows the importance of each one and
helps further process improvement when performing safety analysis. A clear purpose (Table
4) can help practitioners selecting a suitable channel during safety analysis. We believe that
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in developing safety-critical systems, the practitioners are not keen on enriching the amount
of channels, rather, solving the challenges on the existing communication channels to ensure
a safe development process and a safe product. Thus, the 9 communication channels during
safety analysis are convincing. Most of the communication channels are frequently used per
week. In addition, RQ 3 provides 28 purposes of communication during safety analysis.
In the future, we expect that researchers could expand this study to more safety-critical
companies, domains and countries to check and enrich our initial results on the number of
communication channels, their usage frequencies and purposes. Depending on the sizes of
companies, there might be various answers.
For practitioners, RQ 4 might arouse more interest. Practitioners in safety-critical indus-
tries may have these problems in their running projects. The results of RQ 4 (Table 5) can
provide practitioners hints of problems to avoid when they use one of the communication
channels. However, we do not provide any solutions to each specific challenge in this article,
since we believe that the contexts and tools of each communication channel are changing,
the challenges may remain challenges in the future but with different manifestations. The
solutions should be derived in a specific way. Moreover, the mappings between RQ 1 and
RQ 3 as well as between RQ 3 and RQ 4 seem practically useful. For achieving the commu-
nication purposes during safety analysis, the practitioners can select the possible channels
from Table 3 and know the possibly relevant challenges from Table 4. In the future, we
expect that the practitioners could propose more challenges that they have met as well as
solutions, either in a general way or specifically in a context.
6.2. Limitations
We believe that three major limitations threaten the results of our study.
Our sample might not cover all possible roles during safety analysis; the results could
be biased by an over-representation of medium sized companies, and we could not cover all
possible domains where safety analysis is critical (e.g., aerospace). Finally, the sample could
cover only companies from three countries. We believe, however, that the sample is rich and
meets a high standard for qualitative case studies. Our sample of 60 participants covers all
possible company sizes (small, medium, and large), offers data from two geographically and
culturally diverse zones (Germany/Italy and China), and considers three different domains
of interest (automotive, medical, and industry 4.0). For a stronger generalization of our
results, we call for survey studies between companies to go wide where we could go deep
within companies.
Communication occurs frequently and often spontaneously, so it is challenging to observe
it directly. In our case study, while we could perform direct observation sessions, we mostly
collected perceptions and experiences of participants. Memory recalling and other cognitive
biases could over or under-represent certain communication channels and their usage fre-
quency. This is a typical issue of observation studies, questionnaires, and interview-based
designs [49] that we wish to recall nonetheless.
Furthermore, causality chains (e.g., those in RQ 3 and RQ 4) are harder to empirically
demonstrate as there was no controlled experiment testing the claims. There is an open
debate on whether causality can be inferred from research approaches other than controlled
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experiments [49, 50, 51]. We agree with several authors, e.g., Gläser et al. [51], take the
stance that qualitative data analysis can be used to infer causality from the experience of
participants, provided that there is a strong methodology for data gathering and analysis.
We claim that our methodology is robust. We have employed data triangulation validation
whenever possible, for example by adding a three weeks long direct observation to validate
the results and by offering our results to a senior functional safety expert from company
A to check. Still, given the lack of prior literature, we deem our study to be exploratory
in its nature, not confirmatory. We call for future research to empirically demonstrate the
relationship chains that we uncovered.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
To investigate the communication channels during safety analysis, we conducted an in-
dustrial exploratory case study in 7 safety-critical industries with overall 60 participants.
We used surveys, interviews, documentation review and participant observation in a large
automotive company (with three medium subsidiaries), a large medical equipment company,
a medium automotive company and a small industrial 4.0 based production line company.
During three rounds of data collection, we found 9 communication channels during safety
analysis. Most of them happen 1-4 times per week. We summarised 28 purposes of these 9
communication channels and the top 10 challenges across these 9 communication channels.
We notice the importance of communication purposes and map them with the existing chan-
nels and challenges. Our study is mainly limited by the domains, participants’ background
and countries, which cover only 3 safety-critical domains and mainly in Europe and Asia
with only 60 participants.
Further research could expand our study and enrich our preliminary results, such as with
more subjects to generate communication channels between different senders and receivers,
in more safety-critical domains like aviation or railway industries. In addition, a quantitative
assessment for these challenges and some practical solutions are expected to be generated.
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